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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses an econometric model to evaluate the impact of variables influencing the 
long period competitive balance in Italian football league. Using records of the last 75 
tournaments and adopting as a measure of market size both a demand and a supply side 
perspective, the paper aims at establishing if the theoretical prescriptions on the long run 
competitive balance holds for the Italian championships. This approach allows us to evaluate 
if teams outperform their market size and to extract a ranking of the best and worst teams in 
the last 75 years. 3
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on the variables influencing the long period competitive balance in the 
Italian Football League (Serie A) by analysing the records of the championships from season 
1929/30 to season 2006/07.
1 Built around a maximizing profit framework, our econometric 
model tests the theoretical prescription that the winnings ratio among teams strictly depends 
on the relative market size of any single team participating to the league. The empirical 
evidence is then used to establish a ranking of the best and worst teams in the last 75 Serie A
tournaments, net of «national titles» won. 
Two relevant features involving the empirical analysis are worth stressing. The first is the 
assumption of a profit maximizing behaviour by sports’ professional teams. This approach, 
which has been widely debated in the analysis of the organization and management of North 
American sports’ professional leagues,
2 might be questioned when applied to European sports 
teams and to the Italian football league, in particular for the period under investigation.
3 The 
reason is twofold. There is the obvious fact that only in 1996 the law 586 voided the previous 
preclusions to professional teams of distributing profits among shareholders. There is also the 
more relevant fact that the whole league has recently accumulated significant losses 
associated to more than €750.000.000 debt versus the fiscal authority.
4 Nevertheless, we 
believe that the profit maximizing approach is more appealing than the utility maximizing 
procedure. First, because it better grasps the determinants of the competitive balance even 
among teams aiming at social, political, demographical and cultural targets; and secondly 
because the same results obtained under the profit maximization hypothesis could be 
replicated in an utility maximizing framework if appropriate variables and constraints are 
choosen.
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The second issue concerns data collection. Since our estimates involve not only sports data, 
but also demographic and economic data at local level (province or town), for which 
homogeneous and complete time series are not available at our targeting collection, we used 
census returns at ten-years aggregation stage. Major details are given below for each group of 
data.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III presents data 
collection. Section IV discusses procedures and estimation output. Section V adds some 
relevant implications following from the sample restriction to the top-ten teams. Section VI 
concludes.
II. THE MODEL 
Our theoretical model builds around the teams’ profit maximizing behaviour provided by 
Rottenberg (1956) and extended by many others such as El Hodiri and Quirk (1971), Fort and 
Quirk (1995) and Vrooman (2000). Following Wrooman (1995) and Dobson and Goddard 
(2001), we consider an open league of  N  teams. Each team maximizes profits consisting of 
the following total revenues () R  and costs () C  functions: 
β α
i i i W rM R = ,      0 > α , 1 ≤ β      (1) 
δ γ
i i i W cM C = ,     0 ≥ γ , 1 ≥ δ      (2) 
where i indicates the i-th team () N i ,... 2 , 1 = , r  and c are constants,  i M  is the market size, 
i W  is the winnings ratio, α  and β  are the elasticities of total revenues with respect to the 
market size and the winnings ratio, respectively, γ  and δ  the elasticities of total cost to the 
market size and the winnings ratio.
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The winnings ratio is taken to be a multivariate function depending on both deterministic 
(teams’ talents) and stochastic variables. Thus 
( ) ε , , j i i T T f W =      i j ≠ ,     (3) 
where i T  is the talent of team i, j T  is the talent of each other team and ε  a stochastic 
variable with the usual properties 
() 0 = ε E  and    ()
2 σ ε = Var .       (4) 
From (4), the expected value of winnings ratio depends only on the league’s relative available 
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First order condition for profit maximization implies the following solution for each single 


















M W i i .     (6) 


















=        (7) 








Equation (7) is the standard equation for competitive balance between team i and team  j  in 
a profit maximizing framework. This relationship implies the following propositions: 
i)  the winnings ratio between two teams in the long period is strictly related to the 
ratio of theirs market size;6
ii)  a perfect competitive balance is possible only in the presence of teams of equal 
market size.
7
Log-linearizing equation (7) yields 
() j i
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i M M a
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,     (8) 
which is the equation we used in the econometric investigation to test propositions i) and ii).
In order to establish how much of the variability in the long period records between teams in 
Italian Serie A can be explained by the difference in their market size, we performed the 
following OLS equation 
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which allows the coefficients  2 , 1 b  to be estimated. The equation (9) also includes dummy 
variables () D  in order to control for the specific contribution of each team to its records.
8
III. THE DATA 
We investigated the records of the last 75 championships of Italian Serie A from 1929/30 to 
2006/07.
9 The teams in the sample have been chosen among those with at least 20 
appearances in Seria A.
10 This involves a sample of 20 teams, 11,850 matches played and 190 
cross-records.
11 For each registered record we need not to distinguish between home and 
away matches, so that the match records of «Team 1 vs. Team 2» implies also «Team 2 vs. 
Team 1». Data are ordered increasingly with the number of matches played. The records are 
registered taking in the left hand side (i.e., in position of Team 1) the team with the relative 
biggest market size. 7
Although the theoretical model suggests as the best proxy for competitive balance the 
winnings ratio between Team 1 and Team 2, we nonetheless used a number of alternative 
proxies. This links to the difficulty of classifying the concept of the «winnings» in football, 
where the draw is also a possible result. Indeed, while in sports like basketball or baseball or 
American football the draw is not allowed or is a rare event, in football the draw is not only a 
frequent result, but also double faced. For example, a team could take the draw as a quasi-
victory if obtained away from home, but as a quasi-defeat if obtained at home. Alternatively, 
the draw could be taken as a quasi-victory by the home team if it is relatively small, poor of 
talent or less titled with respect to its competitor. We therefore used different measures of 
competitive balance. The first is the standard one. In this case the variables W1 and W2 
(hereafter numbers 1 or 2 denote, respectively, the team on the left and on the right hand side) 
are the ratios between the absolute number of winnings and matches played. The second, 
denoted by W&D2, summarizes the winnings and draws of each team appearing on the right 
hand side.
12 The last, denoted by W&AD (followed by 1 or 2) indicates the number of 
winnings and the away draws of each team. This last specification follows from the different 
weight given to results obtained at home and away from home. It reflects the so called 
«English Average» measure, a scoring table often used by specialized sports magazines and 
newspapers, which defines an optimal profile for records including the victory at home and 
draws away. The variable W&AD therefore weights the draw away just like a victory. 
The independent variables also need some explanations. Generally, the market size is viewed 
from a demand side perspective. This implies that the market size refers to what in 
demography is called «catchment area», namely the largest cities associated to the biggest 
market size.
13 We used two demographic indicators derived from the town and province 
resident population of each team.
14 The first is a proxy of the town population [TP(1 or 2)]. It 
is obtained as a moving average of the ratio between the town resident population and the 8
Italian population, using census returns of ISTAT (Italian Institute of Statistic) with the 
weights given by the number of matches played in the period of reference. To better 
illustrate, let us give an example of the calculus of the market size relative to the match 
«Milan vs. Juventus». They played 144 matches distributed over time as shown in the column 
«matches played» of table 1, whereas the town population ratio for each team for the period 
of reference is reported in the other two columns. 
TABLE 1 
The final row indicates the computed market size of A.C. Milan versus Juventus F.C. 
(0.02685), and the market size of Juventus F.C. versus A.C. Milan (0.01750). This implies 
finding different population data associated with the same team for different matches played 
with the opponents in different periods. 
In computing the population associated to the teams we also used, as a demographic proxy 
the province population since the «catchment area» involves not only the town, but also its 
hinterland. The independent variable related to the province population, called PP(1 or 2), 
was obtained as a moving average ratio between the team’s province population and the 
Italian population. The procedure is the same as for the calculus of TP.
We believe, however, that demographic data catch up only demand effects. The supply side 
effect of the market size should also be considered. This can be sized up by weighting the 
attitude of a specific «area» to support the team financially. The idea is that the richest area 
might be associated with the richest team and hence with better scores.
15 This idea has been 
tested by selecting another variable to the regressors denoted by VA(1 or 2), which estimates 
the impact of province income on teams records. Since complete time series data are not 
available for this variable,
16 we used as a proxy a moving average of the ratio between total 
Value Added in team’s province and Italian Value Added. The procedure replicates the one 
just used for town and province population, except for the periods relating to matches. 9
IV. ESTIMATION OUTPUT 
Our econometric investigation aims at two targets. First, we want to evaluate how much of 
the long run competitive balance variability is explained by the variables used as a proxy for 
the market size. This allows us to identify also the variables that better approximates the 
market size. Second, introducing dummy variables for each team in the sample, we aim at 
testing if each team adds some specific performance to its records other than the one 
summarized by demographic and economic features. This way, a ranking of the best and 
worst teams for the whole sample period can be provided, using estimated coefficients for the 
dummies. 
To show let us dwell on the results given in table A. The table reports the results of twelve 
regression equations - shared out in four set of three - which differ for the dependent 
variables used as a proxy for the winnings ratio, and for the independent variables used as a 
proxy for the relative market size. 
TABLE A 
It can be noted that, independently of the measures adopted for competitive balance, the 
better proxy for the market size is given by the economic variable summarizing the potential 
of the supply side of the team’s area. This result seems to suggest that «have a richer owner»
is more important than «be located in a largest area». On the other hand, we can not neglect 
that in the best fitted equation (regression 3), the market size can explain only a 25 per cent of 
the whole variability. This lead us to introduce dummy variables to control for some 
additional or specific single team performance. 
The inclusion of dummies involves the following steps: 10
a)  From each single regression carry out a test for omitted variables (one for each team), 
obtaining twenty probabilities in order to assess the null hypothesis that the team 
performance does not contribute to explain the variation in the dependent variable. 
b)  From step a) get a rank of probabilities associated to each team, establishing the order 
of the inclusion of each dummy. 
c)  Introduce the dummy one at a time and, for each one, carry out a test for redundant 
variables.
d) Once the omitted and redundant tests confirm the significance of the dummy, 
replicate steps a) and b) for the dummy variable (team) positioned in the second place, 
and so on.
17
The results are summarized in the following table B. 
TABLE B 
Since observations are ordered by the number of matches played, we see that about all the 
regressions suffer from heteroskedasticity.
18 We therefore corrected the estimations with the 
Newey-West Method, after the White Test confirmed the presence of heteroskedasticity.
19
This way we preserved the robustness of the estimation method, selecting a level of statistical 
significance higher than 99 per cent for all regressions. 
The final results show that the inclusion of dummies significantly improves the goodness of 
fit. In particular, using the standard measure of the winning ratio (W1/W2) as the dependent 
variable, the regression catches about 2/3 of the phenomenon variability. This independently 
of the demographic or economic variable chosen. 
The results also show that (W1/W2) and (W&AD1/W&AD2) are better approximations of 
competitive balance when expressed in terms of market size. The impact of demographic data 
is significantly reduced or go to zero if alternative measures of competitive balance, as 
(W1/W&D2) and (W1/W&AD2), are used. This supports our hypothesis that different views 11
of the competitive balance in terms of records require different explicative variables. For the 
independent variable, we can see that the inclusion of dummies reduces the impact of 
demographic and economic factors, although retaining the standard level of significance, and 
that the province population shows to be a better proxy for the market size with respect to the 
town population and the province Value Added, particularly when the competitive balance is 
measured by the standard winnings ratio. 
Let us now deal with the issue of which is the best and/or the worst team(s) of the Italian 
football league of the last 75 years. Specifically, the best team is the one that adds to its 
performance more than its demographic and/or economics features suggest. On the contrary, 
the worst team(s) is the one whose records are below the expectations related to its 
demographic and/or economic environment. From the demographic perspective, and focusing 
only on regressions with the standard competitive balance measure (W1/W2), we see that five 
teams performed more than it was predicted by their market size: Juventus F.C., Inter F.C., 
A.C. Milan, A.C.F. Fiorentina and Bologna F.C.; the worst teams were U.S. Palermo, Brescia 
C. and A.S. Bari. However, while the order of the worst teams changes if other independent 
variables are used, the order of the best teams is confirmed for each regression selected. 
Alternatively, if we adopt an economic perspective we see that no other team adds to the 
«black list», while three teams performed more than what is implied by their economic 
features: in decreasing order S.S.C. Napoli, A.S. Roma and Torino F.C..  
V. SAMPLE ADJUSTEMENT AND EXTENSIONS  
The natural extension of the previous econometric estimations is to restrict the sample to the 
top teams to test for the hypothesis that the theoretical prescriptions do not depend on the 
sample selected. This way we replicated the previous estimations selecting the first ten teams 12
in terms of appearances in Serie A and repeated the above procedure selecting the winnings 
ratio (W1/W2) as a proxy for competitive balance. The results are quite amazing. First, the 
demographic features fail to explain any records in terms of competitive balance. The 
hypothesis that its coefficient is different from zero is rejected in all regressions. This seems 
to suggest that the impact of the market size on competitive balance holds only when the 
market sizes are very different and disappears in presence of teams located in the largest 
towns. On the contrary, the impact of economic factors summarizing the supply side effect 
remains confirmed. The results are shown in table C.  
TABLE C 
Although the variability explained by the Value Added is lower with respect to the previous 
case shown in table A, the results appear more satisfying in terms of team specific 
performance. Adding each team one at a time we see that starting from a value of R
2 of about 
15 per cent, the dummy of Juventus F.C. pushes the index above the 50 per cent!
20 This is the 
only case in which a team adds specific performance to the Value Added variables. Other 
teams, such as S.S. Lazio, A.S. Roma, U.C. Sampdoria and Torino F.C., performed below the 
standards suggested by the economic data. What is surprising is that, although the 
observations reduced from 188 to 45, the estimation output caught almost the 80 per cent of 
the phenomenon variability! This rises the question of why Juventus F.C. adds so great 
performance to its records with respect to other teams. A list of factors might be: 
management ability, richness, talents’ market monopoly power, referees’ psychology 
subjection, illegal behaviour, and so on.
21 We let the reader to chose the preferred one and, if 
possible, to test for it. 
VI. CONCLUSION 13
In this paper we have tested the hypothesis that the long run competitive balance is 
determined by the relative market size of the team participating to the league. We 
concentrated on Italian Serie A records of the last 75 tournaments selecting a sample of 20 
team with the largest appearances to the championships. We introduced different measure of 
market size. We adopted both a demand side and a supply side perspective, using 
demographic data as a proxy for demand effects, and the richness of the team’s area for 
evaluating the potential supply side effects. We also used several measure of competitive 
balance in order to assess the relevance of draws in football matches. We find that the market 
size explain at best a quarter of the phenomenon variability with no much differences in the 
contribution of demographic and economic features. We also investigated the ability of each 
team to add specific performances to its own records beyond those predicted by demographic 
and economic features. This way, identifying the best and the worst team of the last 75 years, 
a «gold and black list» was obtained. 
The analysis was then restricted to the top ten teams participating to the league. We found 
that only five teams, among «the biggest», significantly contributed to the goodness of fit, 
and that only one adds positive performance to its records, Juventus F.C.. 14
NOTES
1.  A comprehensive discussion of competitive balance is in Downward and Dawson 
(2000), Sandy et al. (2004) and Leeds and Von Allmen (2005). See also the articles published 
in the volume 3, n.2, of the Journal of Sports Economics (2003).
2.  See for example Sloane (1971) and his exceptions to the previous contributions of 
Rottenberg (1956), Neale (1964) and Jones (1969). On this theme see also Scully (1974). 
3.  The issue of a profit maximizing behaviour involves not only professional teams, but 
also firms in general. See, for example, the amusing contribution of Romer (2006) who uses 
sport’s environment as a proxy for irrational firms behaviour. 
4.  See Lago et al. (2004). 
5.  The relationship between the winnings ratio and the market size can be derived from a 
utility maximizing framework if the objective function is directly related to the winnings, 
subject to a non negative constraint on profits which, in turn, are related to revenues and 
market size. On this point see Kesenne (2000 and 2005). 
6.  The standard hypothesis considers that the price for unit of talent is the same for each 
team imposing  0 = γ . In our formalization we only restrict  α γ ≤ ≤ 0 . For the others 
parameters restrictions see Vrooman (1995). 
7.  The limit case of perfect competitive balance, where  γ α =  and/or  δ β →  and hence 
0 = a , is omitted. 
8.  The dummy variables are equal to 1, -1 or 0. It is 0 if teams is not involved. It is 1 or -1 
if the match under investigation includes the team and it is positioned on the left or on the 
right hand side, respectively. 
9.  The data for the period 1929/30 to 1998/99 are from Tommasi (2000). The data from 
1999/00 to 2006/07 are from Almanacco Illustrato del Calcio – Panini - 2000 and ss.. 15
10. Remember that the Italian football league admits relegation to/promotion from a lower 
series, so that great changes in the rooster are possible. Only Inter F.C. participated to all 
tournaments in the period under investigation. The team with the least number of 
participation is U.S. Palermo, which appeared in 20 tournaments. 
11. Among the 20 teams only two matches have never been played in Serie A, Triestina-
Verona and Triestina-Cagliari, so that the number of observations reduces to 188. 
12. Recall that position 2 refers to the team with the relative smallest market size. 
13. See Leeds and Von Allmen (2005). 
14. For data about town and province resident population see the Italian Institute of 
Statistic web site at www.istat.it.
15. Obviously it might be the case that the owner of the team is not located in the team’s 
area, but typically there is a strong link between the ownership and the team’s area.  
16. There are only six data at the province level available at ten years aggregation: 
1951/61/71/81/91/99. For economic data at province level we refer to Tagliacarne Institute. 
17. Note that, in order to maintain the powerful of the regression, all the null hypothesis 
are accepted only if significance is at least of 99 per cent.  
18. The first records come from a limited number of matches, while the final records were 
obtained from a much higher number of matches (the range is 6-148). 
19. See White (1980) and Newey and West (1987). 
20. Obviously, we also in these cases performed the test for omitted and redundant 
variables.
21. The political and economic weight of the Juventus F.C.’s ownership and management 
has been and still is one of the more debated issue in Italian sport environment. Recently the 
team was relegated in Serie B and the national title of 2005/06 has been revoked for illegal 
behaviour of its team’s management. See Tavella (2006) and Ghirelli (1990).  16
REFERENCES 
Almanacco Illustrato del Calcio (2000 and ss.). Panini, Modena. 
Baroncelli, A., Lago, U. & Szymanski, S. (2004). Il Business del Calcio, Egea, Milano. 
Dobson, S. & Goddard, J. (2001). The Economics of Football. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (UK). 
Downward, P. & Dawson, A. (2000). The Economics of Professional Team Sports. Routledge 
Edition, London. 
El Hodiri, M. & Quirk, J. (1971). An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League. 
Journal of Political Economy, 79, 1302-1319. 
Fort, R. & Quirk, J. (1995). Cross-subsidization, Incentives, and Outcome in Professional 
Team Sports Leagues. Journal of Economic Literature, 33, 1265-99. 
Ghirelli, A. (1990). Storia del calcio in Italia, Einaudi, Torino, 1990.
Jones, J. C. H. (1969). The Economics of the National Hockey League. Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 2, 1-20. 
Kesenne, S. (2000). Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sport. 
Journal of Sports Economics, 1, 56-65. 
Kesenne, S. (2005). The organization of European football and the competitive balance 
within and between the nations. University of Antwerp Working Papers, 2005/001. 
Leeds, M. & Von Allmen, P. (2005). The Economics of Sports – 2
nd ed., Addison Wesley 
Publishing, Boston (MA). 
Neale, W. C. (1964). The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports: A Contribution to the 
Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market Competition. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 78, 1-14. 17
Newey, W. & West, K. (1987). A Simple Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix. Econometrica, 55, 703–708. 
Romer, D. (2006). Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football. Journal of 
Political Economy, 114, 340-365. 
Rottenberg, S. (1956). The Baseball Players’ Labor Market. Journal of Political Economy, 3, 
242-258.
Sandy, R., Sloane, P.J. & Rosentraub, M.S. (2004). The Economics of Sport – An 
International Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Scully, G. W. (1974). Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball. American Economic 
Review, 64, 915-930. 
Sloane, P. J. (1971). The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility 
Maximiser. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 18, 121-146. 
Tavella, R. (2006). Il libro nero del calcio italiano. Newton & Compton, Roma. 
Tommasi, R. (2000). Storia della Serie A – Il Calcio del Girone Unico. Marchesi Grafiche 
Editoriali, Roma. 
Vrooman, J. (1995). A General Theory of Professional Sports Leagues. Southern Economic 
Journal, 61, 971-990. 
Vrooman, J. (2000). The Economics of American Sports Leagues. Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 47, 364-398. 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for 
Heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48, 817–838. 18
TABLE 1: town population ratio (TP) calculus 
Period  Matches played  TOWN POPULATION RATIOS 
   MILAN  JUVENTUS 
<1931 4 0.023064  0.0141831 
1932-1936 10 0.0259517  0.0146326 
1937-1951 24 0.0268153  0.0151381 
1952-1961 20 0.0312583  0.0202636 
1962-1971 20 0.0319929  0.0215743 
1972-1981 18 0.0283744  0.0197527 
1982-1991 18 0.0241155  0.0169521 
1992-2001 20 0.0220403  0.0151811 
2002-2007 10 0.0220431  0.01523 
Total 144  0.02685  0.01750 19






























































2 R 0.092 0.172 0.254 0.088 0.148 0.203 0.091 0.198 0.238 0.103 0.185 0.245 
Standard error of 
regression  0.6125 0.5922 0.5362 0.5218 0.5121 0.4650 0.4756 0.4565 0.4398 0.5689 0.5478 0.5099 
Akaike info 
criterion  1.868 1.801 1.602 1.547 1.510 1.317 1.362 1.281 1.206 1.721 1.645 1.501 
Jarque-Bera 




0.819 0.079 0.597 0.322 0.004 0.138 0.368 0.112 0.013 0.642 0.033 0.098 
 Standard error in parenthesis – Significance level > 99% 
*Newey-West HAC Standard Errors correction 20
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CAGLIARI           0.335 
(0.1202)     
























GENOA  -0.327 
(0.0839) 
-0.274 
(0.0736)          



















































(0.0643)        0.203 
(0.0739) 



















































SAMPDORIA  -0.206 
(0.0594) 
-0.174 
(0.0600)          














TRIESTINA  -0.273 
(0.0987) 
-0.274 
(0.0823)          
UDINESE              
VERONA              
VICENZA              
2 R 0.667 0.666 0.643 0.645 0.647 0.576 0.569 0.559 0.512 0.629 0.638 0.596 
Standard error of 
regression  0.3708 0.3760 0.3711 0.3257 0.3296 0.3391 0.3276 0.3384 0.3519 0.3649 0.3650 0.3731 
Akaike info 
criterion  0.925 0.938 0.922 0.666 0.675 0.732 0.664 0.723 0.786 0.832 0.879 0.923 
Jarque-Bera 




0.068 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.172 0.008 0.001 0.114 0.010 0.006 21
Mean of residuals 
= 0 prob.  0.952 0.789 0.901 0.963 0.852 0.855 0.893 0.901 0.993 0.940 0.892 0.937 
Standard error in parenthesis 
 Significance level > 99% 
*Newey-West HAC Standard Errors Correction
TABLE C: OLS ESTIMATION 
45 OBSERVATIONS 
Dependent variables  LOG 
(W1/W2)





















































TORINO        -0.264 
(0.0398) 
2 R 0.155 0.507 0.586 0.648 0.724  0.789 
Standard error of regression  0.4207 0.3215 0.2947 0.2717  0.240  0.210 
Akaike info criterion  1.150 0.633 0.479 0.336 0.110  -0.137 
Jarque-Bera prob.  0.347 0.464 0.655 0.628 0.821  0.224 
White heteroskedasticity test  0.451 0.314 0.811 0.903 0.248  0.016 
Mean of residuals = 0 prob.  0.888 0.661 0.697 0.715 0.707  0.818 
 Standard error in parenthesis – Significance level > 99% 
*Newey-West HAC Standard Errors correction 